Perdurance, endurance, and 'havingh a property atemporally' by Rychter, Pablo
Perdurance, endurance, and ‘having a property atemporally’.1
This is the author's pre-print version. Final version published in Metaphysica IX, 2: 159-171 (2008). The 
final publication is available at link.springer.com: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12133-008-
0029-8
Pablo Rychter
In this paper I want to focus on a common feature of two opposing views on persistence and change–
perdurance theory on the one hand, and the specific version of endurance theory sometimes known as ‘the 
relations-to-times view’, on the other. The common feature I want to highlight is this: both theories rely on  
an atemporal notion of property instantiation and relation bearing. I distinguish two possible meanings of 
‘atemporal’, which result in two different understandings of what it is for an object to have a property or  
to  bear  a  relation  atemporally.  I  show  that  standard  presentations  of  the  theories  considered  are 
indeterminate as to  which of these two understandings  is  the intended one.  I  claim that  even if  both 
understandings are admissible, one of them is more attractive and has more to recommend than the other. 
I proceed as follows: in section 1, I offer an initial characterization of the two views to be discussed, and 
explain in which sense both of them presuppose a common notion of atemporal exemplification. In section  
2, I discuss some potential  worries about my claim that the relations-to-times-view employs a notion 
atemporal  exemplification  just  as  perdurance  theory  does.  In  section  3,  I  distinguish  two  senses  of 
‘atemporally’ and show that both of them yield reasonable understandings of the views. In section 4, I  
argue for one of these understandings in particular. The reasons offered bear on a reconsideration of what 
theories  of  persistence  are  primarily  intended  to  explain.  In  the  final  section,  I  discuss  further  how 
perdurance theory looks like when understood as recommended in section 4. I also discuss there how my 
distinction between two understandings of ‘atemporally’ helps to see what is wrong with the no-change 
objection
1. Two opposing views on persistence and change.
1 [Acknowledgments deleted for blind refereeing].
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In this section, I present very summarily the two views on persistence and change that I want to consider, 
paying  special  attention  to  their  shared  feature  mentioned  above.  Let  me  first  make  clear  what  I 
understand by ‘persistence’, ‘change’ and ‘theories of persistence’. Following Lewis (1986), I say that an 
object x persists iff x exists at different times. And I say that x changes with respect to a property P iff x 
exemplifies P at some time and fails to do so at some other time in which x exists. Theories of persistence 
for a domain of objects O are intended to explain how objects in O persist, i.e. in virtue of which facts 
they manage to exist at different times. This explanation must be compatible with a coherent account of 
what it is for these objects to exemplify different properties at different times, and thus with a coherent 
account of change. Consider for instance a banana that is wholly green at a time t1 and wholly yellow at 
some later time t2. This banana persists from t1 to t2 and has different colour properties at each of these 
times, thereby changing with respect to colour. Theories of persistence are intended to explain in virtue of 
which facts all these claims about the banana are true. 
According to  perdurance theory,  ordinary objects  like the banana persist  by perduring,  i.e. by having 
different temporal parts at each time in which they exist. For our present purposes, we can provisionally 
understand the notion of temporal part in the following way: x is a temporal part of y at t iff x exists at t 
and only at t, and x has the same spatial location as y at t. (An alternative definition will be discussed in 
section 5). Therefore, according to perdurance theory, the banana’s persistence from t1 to t2 is a matter of 
the banana’s having two temporal parts, one at each of those times. These temporal parts are numerically 
distinct  objects,  which  we  may  call  bananat1 and  bananat2 respectively.  Regarding  temporal 
exemplification  of  properties,  this  is  what  perdurance  theory  says  (at  least  for  some  properties):  a 
perduring object exemplifies a property P at a time t iff the object’s temporal part at  t exemplifies  P. It 
follows from this that a perduring object changes whit respect to a property P iff one of its temporal parts 
exemplifies P and some other of its temporal parts fails to do so. What ultimately makes true our claim 
that the banana changes its colour from t1 to t2 is the fact that bananat1 is green, bananat2 is yellow and both 
are temporal parts of the perduring banana. 
The RTT view, on the other hand, is the conjunction of  endurance theory and a  relational account of  
temporal  qualification.  Let us review these two components in order. According to endurance theory, 
ordinary objects like the banana persist by enduring, i.e. by being wholly present at each time in which 
they exist.  For our present purposes,  we can cash out this metaphor as just  the denial  of perdurance 
theory’s  distinctive claim,  i.e.  as  the  denial  that  persisting  objects  have  temporal  parts.  Thus,  in  our 
example there are not two different objects, one of them green and the other yellow. Rather, it is one and 
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the same object,  the enduring banana itself,  which is first green and then yellow. Of course, it  is not  
claimed that the banana is both green and yellow simpliciter, but rather that it is so at different times. The 
second component of the RTT view, the relational account of temporal qualification [RTQ], is an account 
of what it is for an enduring object to have a property  at a time. According to  [RTQ],  all apparently 
monadic  properties  of  enduring  objects  are  really  binary  relations  between  objects  and  times,  or 
equivalently, relational properties that have these relations as constituents. (More generally, any apparently  
n-adic relation exemplified by an enduring object, is in fact a  n+1-adic relation in which the additional 
argument place is occupied by a time). So, for instance, the banana’s being green at t1 is not a matter of the 
banana’s exemplifying a monadic property.  Instead, it  is a matter of the banana’s bearing a particular 
relation (which we may call ‘the green-at relation’) to t1. Therefore, what ultimately makes true our claim 
that the banana changes its colour from t1 to t2 is the fact that the banana bears the green-at relation to t1 
and the yellow-at relation to t2. 
With this rough outline of perdurance theory and the RTT view already in place, I want to focus now on a 
feature  shared  by  both  views,  namely  the  reliance  on  an  atemporal notion  of  property  and  relation 
exemplification. In the case of perdurance theory, this assumption is very often made explicit in standard 
presentations of the view. So for instance, T. Sider says that “[perdurantists] tend to employ an atemporal  
notion of exemplification of properties and relations”, and that as a special case of this, they “tend to 
speak of the parts of an object simpliciter, rather than the parts it has at this time or that”.2 On the other 
hand, also the RTT view relies on an atemporal notion of property and relation exemplification. Though 
not so often noticed, this point is explicitly acknowledged in K. Hawley’s well articulated presentation of 
the RTT view: “the ‘relations-to-times’ response to the problem of change enables the endurance theorist 
to give an atemporal description of the banana. (…) If I say that banana is or was green on Monday, then 
what I say is true of it if and only if the banana bears (atemporally) the green at relation to Monday”.3 To 
make the analogy between the two views clear, let me illustrate it with my running example.
Both theories picture the persisting banana as having its different properties at  t1 and t2, but explain this 
temporary  exemplification  in  terms  that  involve  atemporal exemplification.  According  to  perdurance 
theory as characterized by Sider, there are two salient kinds of facts that obtain atemporally. First, bananat1 
and  bananat2 are  temporal  parts  of  the  perduring  banana  atemporally.  Second,  bananat1 atemporally 
2 Sider (2001), p. 56. Here and elsewhere I have replaced ‘perdurantists’ by ‘fourdimensionalists’. This replacement is harmless  
in the present context, even if fourdimensionalism as defined by Sider is not in general equivalent to perdurantism as defined  
here.  
3 Hawley (2001), pgs. 17, 24. It is worth mentioning that Hawley herself does not subscribe the RTT view. 
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exemplifies  greenness and bananat2 atemporally exemplifies  yellowness.  That is to say,  temporal parts 
exemplify  their  properties  and  relations  atemporally and,  as  a  special  case  of  this,  they  enter  into 
mereological relations and are parts of perduring objects atemporally. A complete perdurantist description 
of the banana’s lifespan would consist in statement of which are (atemporally) the banana’s temporal parts 
and which properties these temporal parts (atemporally) exemplify. Since all these facts hold atemporally, 
such a description would be most accurately stated in a language that, unlike ordinary English, allows for 
tenseless verbs. But if, as it happens, ordinary English is employed for making claims such as ‘banana t1 is 
part of the banana’, the ‘is’ should not be understood as present-tensed, i.e. as expressing a merely present  
and temporary fact. According to the RTT view as characterized by Hawley, on the other hand, what  
obtains atemporally is the banana’s bearing the green-at relation to t1, and its bearing the yellow-at relation 
to  t2. That is to say, according to the RTT view the banana bears its relations to times  atemporally. A 
complete description of the banana’s lifespan in terms of the RTT view would consist in a statement of  
which relations the banana bears (atemporally) to which times. Also in this case, since these facts hold 
atemporally,  such  a  description  would  be  most  accurately  stated  in  a  language  that,  unlike  ordinary 
English, allows for tenseless verbs. But if, as it happens, ordinary English is employed for making claims 
such as ‘the banana bears green at to  t1’, the ‘bears’ should not be understood as present-tensed, i.e. as 
expressing a merely present and temporary fact.
I  will  address  the  issue  of  what  exactly  ‘atemporally’ means  in  section  3.  But  before  that,  let  me  
emphasize a point that has been implicit so far. In the present context, claims to the effect that a particular  
property or relation is exemplified  atemporally, or that a “fact” is (or is not) temporally qualified, are 
intended to be about ontology, and not about the language in which ontology is described. For instance,  
when the perdurantist says that bananat1 is  atemporally green, what he means is that  the having of the  
property itself is atemporal, or not temporally qualified. The claim is not that the  sentence ‘bananat1 is 
green’ is in somehow atemporal or not temporally qualified, or that the verb in that sentence is somehow 
atemporal or tenseless. Theories of persistence are about what it is for objects to exist at times, not about 
the linguistic expressions we use to describe them. 
2. Two relevantly different notions of exemplification?
My claim that atemporal exemplification is a feature common to both views may strike the reader as  
surprising. This is because, as I said, reliance on atemporal exemplification is often acknowledged with 
respect to perdurance theory, but not so often with respect to the RTT view. In fact, Sider’s remarks quoted 
above may be taken to imply that atemporal exemplification is a distinctive feature of perdurance theory, 
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something in which perdurance theory differs from rival views. More to the point, Sider emphasises an 
alleged  contrast  between  the  perdurantist  notion  of  parthood,  which  is  typically  atemporal,  and  the 
corresponding endurantist notion, which is typically relative to times. And he goes on to claim that “as it is  
with parthood, so it is with predication generally. For the [perdurantist], temporary properties like being 5 
feet tall are had simpliciter (by temporal parts), whereas the [endurantist] insists that such ‘properties’ are 
had only relatively to times”. These remarks are potentially misleading. They seem to contradict my claim 
that  atemporal  exemplification  is  a  feature  of  the  RTT view as  much as  it  is  of  perdurance  theory.  
However,  correctly  understood,  they do not.  In order  to avoid confusion,  let  me explain how Sider’s 
remarks fit my presentation of the views so far. 
Let us call ‘A’ the skin of the persisting banana, and ‘B’ the persisting banana itself. Both perdurance 
theory and the RTT view will then accept as true the following sentence of ordinary English:
(1) A is part of B at t1.
Everyday judgements like (1) picture the banana as an object existing at different times and exemplifying 
different properties and relations at those times. Both theories take at face value these judgments, but 
claim that they are ultimately made true by facts that obtain atemporally. The theories differ as to which 
exactly these atemporal facts are, as follows:
(2) A is part of B at t1 iff At1 is (atemporally) part of Bt1. (Where ‘At1’ names the temporal part of A at t1 
and ‘Bt1’ names the temporal part of B at t1).
(3) A is part of B at t1 iff A bears (atemporally) the triadic relation being-part-of-at to B and t1.
Now, there is a sense in which the parthood relation invoked in the right-hand side of (3) is time-relative, 
whereas the parthood relation invoked in the right-hand side (2) is not: the former but not the latter has a  
time as one of its relata. This is the point emphasized by Sider’s remarks above. I agree that there is this  
difference between the two relations of parthood. However, there is also a unique sense in which both 
relations are atemporal and not time-relative: unlike the ‘everyday’ parthood relation featuring in the left-
hand side of (2) and (3), which holds at t1, both the dyadic and triadic parthood relations featuring in the 
right-hand-side hold simpliciter, not relatively to times. In the case of the triadic relation postulated by the 
RTT view, t1 is a relatum of the relation and not something which qualifies the relation itself; i.e., A, B,  
and t1 exemplify the relation simpliciter rather than at t1. (Compare: if I bear the relation being younger 
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than GW Bush, GW Bush is a relatum of the relation, and not something relatively to which the relation  
holds; the relation holds simpliciter, rather than for GW Bush). In short, my present point is that according 
to both views, the properties and relations that objects really exemplify –i.e. those in virtue of which they 
can be said to exemplify properties and relations  at  times— are themselves  atemporally exemplified. 
Thus, Sider remark that “we can think of the [perdurantist’s] notions of atemporal parthood, and atemporal  
exemplification  generally,  as  being  those  we  employ  when  we  take  an  ‘atemporal  perspective’ and 
contemplate the whole of time”4 applies also to the triadic notion of parthood employed by the RTT view. 
The RTT view pictures persisting objects from an atemporal perspective as much as perdurance theory 
does. 
        
3. Two senses of ‘atemporally’. 
We have seen that both perdurance theory and the RTT view are sometimes presented as claiming that 
some facts –exemplification of properties and relations– obtain atemporally. It is now high time to address 
the issue of what exactly ‘atemporally’ means. In the present section, I argue that there are two different 
understandings of ‘atemporally’, and that the standard presentations of the theories are compatible with 
both. However, in next section I will argue that, relatively to certain purposes, one of these understandings  
yields better results than the other. 
The point requires the following terminology to be introduced. Let us say that an object x is eternally F iff 
x is always F, i.e. if x is F at all times in which x exists. On the other hand, let us say that x is timelessly F 
iff x is F not relatively to times, i.e. iff x is F simpliciter (with respect to times). I intend these two notions 
to be non-equivalent. In particular, if something x is eternally F, it cannot be F simpliciter (with respect to 
times). On the contrary, if x is always F, i.e. if x is F eternally, then for every time t in which x exists, x is F 
relatively to t. In other words, being F eternally is just a particular way of being F relatively to times, a 
limiting case that involves universal quantification over times. 
This difference between being F eternally and being F timelessly is a special  case of a more general 
difference between what we might call ‘being F absolutely with respect to a parameter P’ and ‘being F 
simpliciter (with respect to a parameter P)’. As an example, consider the property of being useless, which 
we may attribute to some ordinary objects and artefacts. Objects are not useless  simpliciter, but rather 
relatively to purposes; moreover, one and the same object can be both useless and not useless, relatively to 
different purposes. Of course, there might be objects which are absolutely useless, i.e. objects such that, 
4 Sider (2001), p. 56.
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for any purpose  p that you might think of, they are useless relatively to  p. But even these  absolutely 
useless objects are useless relatively to purposes, though in uninteresting way. Now, suppose that one of 
these absolutely useless objects has a mass of 20 pounds. This is a property that the object has simpliciter 
(with respect to purposes) rather than absolutely. It is not the case that, for any purpose p, the object has a 
mass of 20 pounds relatively to p. Having a particular mass, unlike being useless, is not a property that 
objects have relatively to purposes. 
Now, my central purpose in this section is to show that the standard presentations or perdurance theory 
and the RTT view discussed above are indeterminate as to which understanding of ‘atemporally’ is the 
intended one in their claims to the effect that objects exemplify properties (or relations) atemporally. Let 
us  consider  first  the  perdurantist’s  claim  that  the  banana’s  temporal  parts  exemplify  their  properties 
atemporally. We can focus in the claim that bananat1 is atemporally green. According to one understanding 
of this claim, bananat1 is green eternally, i.e. at all times in which it exists. In fact, since banana t1 only exist 
at t1, this claim is true iff bananat1 is green at t1. This, I think, is a plausible understanding of Sider’s claim 
that,  when talking  about  what  properties  temporal  parts  have,  we should  contemplate  them from an 
atemporal perspective, as if we were watching the whole of time at once. On the present understanding,  
what we would contemplate from such a perspective is a myriad of short lived objects,  each of them 
existing at only one time and having its properties  at that time. But the original claim that bananat1 is 
atemporally green could also be understood as the claim that bananat1 is green simpliciter (with respect to 
times) rather than eternally. On this second understanding, it is not part of the view that banana t1 is green 
at t1. Rather, once the view has been adopted, the question of whether banana t1 is green  at t1 does not 
really arise. (In the same way as the question of whether this thing weights 20 pounds  for my present  
purposes does  not  arise).  On the  present  understanding  of  ‘atemporal’,  what  we would  see  from an 
atemporal perspective is myriad of short lived objects having its different properties simpliciter rather than 
at a time. This timeless exemplification of properties by temporal parts is that in virtue of which, from a 
temporal perspective, the perduring banana has different properties at different times. I will soon come 
back to the details of this second understanding of perdurance theory. For the moment, it is enough if I 
have shown that it is plausible as an understanding of the perdurantist proposal. 
Let us now turn to the RTT view. According to the first understanding of ‘atemporally’ (as eternally), the 
RTT theorist’s claim that the banana bears green-at to t1 atemporally boils down to the claim that it always 
bears that relation to t1. More generally, at every time in which the banana exists, it bears exactly the same 
relations  to  the  same  times.  This  understanding  of  the  RTT  view  is  compatible  with  the  minimal 
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characterization of the view offered above, and has actually been assumed in recent discussions of it, as  
will become apparent later. According to the second understanding of ‘atemporally’ (as timelessly), it is 
actually inappropriate to say that the banana bears  green at to  t1 at t1 (or  always,  or  sometimes). The 
relations to times invoked by the RTT view are born simpliciter rather than at times. The enduring banana 
is located at different times and has different colours at those times in virtue of bearing different relations  
to them. But these relations in virtue of which the banana is temporally qualified are not themselves born 
at times but rather timelessly. As in the case of perdurance theory, we can compare the two understandings 
by considering how the enduring banana would look like from an atemporal perspective in each case. If 
by ‘atemporally’ we mean eternally, from an atemporal perspective we would see the banana as existing at 
different times (maybe by being multiply located) and bearing, at each of those times, the same relations 
to the same times (and other relata). (Notice that in this picture times feature a double role, so to speak:  
they are both the locations in which the banana successively exists, and the relata of relations like green 
at, yellow at, etc). If on the other hand, by ‘atemporal’ we mean timeless, an atemporal perspective will 
show the banana somehow outside time, and bearing different relations to different times. These are the 
relations in virtue of which,  from a temporal perspective, the banana has different colours at different 
times. I think this second understanding of the RTT view seems to be a fairly natural one, and in any case 
allowed by the standard characterization of the view offered in section 1.
4. Two possible goals for theories of persistence and a reason for timeless property exemplification. 
In the previous section I have argued that standard presentations of both perdurance theory and the RTT 
view are susceptible  of being coherently understood in two different ways,  corresponding to  the two 
different meanings of ‘atemporally’ that I have distinguished. In the present section, I argue that one of 
these two understandings fares better than the other. In particular, I argue that both views turn out to be 
more interesting if construed as employing the notion of ‘timeless  exemplification’ rather than ‘eternal 
exemplification’.  
My reason for preferring timeless exemplification has to do with my view about what the primary goal of  
both perdurance theory and the RTT view is.  As other theories  of persistence,  I  take these views as 
intended to explain what it is for an object to exist at different times, an to exemplify (possibly different) 
properties at those times. What I want to point out is that this goal is actually somewhat more ambitious 
than merely explaining change, or solving what is sometimes called ‘the  problem of change’, i.e. the 
alleged problem of  explaining  how it  is  possible  for  one  and the  same object  to  exemplify  different 
properties at different times. In my view, if theories of persistence are needed at all, they would also be 
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needed in order to describe a completely static world in which objects did not change at all. Even for a 
banana that remained inalterably green all along its existence from t1 to tn, a theory of persistence should 
tell us what it is for that banana to be green at t1, at t2…etc. This point –i.e. that it is temporal qualification 
in  general  and  not  merely  change  what  is  at  issue  between  perdurance  and  the  endurance—is  also 
presupposed  by  some  of  the  authors  who  engage  in  this  discussion.  For  instance,  after  her  initial 
characterization of views discussed here, Hawley explicitly says that “I will simply refer to the ‘problem 
of change’. But the underlying issue is not specifically about change. Rather, it is about what underpins 
our talk about objects as they are at different times—what, if anything, can we say about how a persisting 
object atemporally is, and how does this relate to our talk about how the object is at different times”.5 To 
summarize the point: I follow Hawley in understanding the views discussed before as primarily intended 
to explain what it is for an object to have a property at a time (for instance, what it is for the banana to be 
green at t1) rather than what it is for it to change over time (i.e., for the banana to be green at t1 and yellow 
at t2). 
Differentiating between these two possible goals for theories of persistence does matter for our present 
purposes. In a nutshell, the point is this: if our primary explanandum is just change, then we can construe 
our theories of persistence as relying on the notion of having a property eternally. But if our goal is more 
ambitious and we want to explain temporal qualification in general (i.e. what it is for an object to have a 
property  at a time) then we should better  employ the notion of having a property  timelessly.  Let  me 
elaborate  on  this  point.  Suppose  that  explaining  change were  our  primary  motivation  for  developing 
theories of persistence. That is to say, suppose that we are puzzled by the fact that one and the same 
banana is green at t1 and yellow at t2, and we feel the need for an explanation of how this is possible. Then, 
something that could mitigate our concerns is a reduction of all temporary facts to eternal facts. In this 
scenario, what causes our puzzlement is the temporary character of some facts, such as that the banana is 
green at  t1 but not at t2. We should therefore feel relieved if someone tells us that the banana’s being 
temporary green is  really a matter of something going on eternally. And this is exactly what theories of 
persistence do, if we understand them as relying on  eternal  (rather than timeless) exemplification. So 
understood, perdurance theory tell us that the banana’s being temporally green is really a matter of having 
always a  temporal  part  which  is  always green.  The  RTT view,  on  the  other  hand,  tells  us  that  the 
problematic temporary fact is really a matter of the banana’s bearing always a particular relation to a time. 
So, both theories tell us that,  really, there is nothing to worry about: nothing  really is only temporary 
green. We can therefore conclude that if our primary concern is  change,  then a theory of persistence 
5 Hawley (2001), p. 16.
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relying on the notion of ‘having a property eternally’ may be enough; such a theory will in actually reduce 
all allegedly problematic temporary facts to facts that obtain eternally, and thus remove the alleged source  
of puzzlement. 
But as suggested above, our primary concern as theorists of persistence might be other than change.  We 
might rather be interested in temporal qualification in general. That is to say, in explaining what it is for an 
object  to  have  a  property  at  a  time.  (Remember  that  by  ‘temporal  qualification’ I  mean  ontological 
temporal qualification, rather than linguistic qualification; we are interested in explaining what it is for an 
object to exist at a time t, rather than explaining how the linguistic expression ‘at t’ works or means. These 
two tasks may be related, but it is important in the present context not to conflate them). I think myself  
that this second explanandum is more worth of attention than change by itself, but I do not need to argue  
for this here. For the present purposes, it is enough if we recognize it as a genuinely distinct explanandum, 
over and above the issue of change, and as one that theories of persistence may reasonably be intended to 
explain. As we saw, at least Hawley assumes this much. My present point is that for people like Hawley 
and me, who think that the primary explanandum of theories of persistence is over and above the issue of  
change, an account in terms of timeless exemplification would be more satisfying that an account in terms 
of eternal exemplification. (This point also applies to people ready make the weaker claim that if there is 
an issue to be explained by theories of persistence at all, the issue is not particularly about change). The 
reason is straightforward: an account of persistence in terms of timeless exemplification would afford a 
reduction of  all temporally qualified facts (both merely temporary and eternal facts) to non-temporally-
qualified facts, i.e. facts that do not obtain at times. Consider a banana that is both only temporary green 
(say, green at t1 but not at t2) and eternally bent (i.e., bent at every time in which it exists). Given that our 
present concern is not merely change but rather temporal qualification itself, these two facts about the 
banana are equally ‘problematic’, and both of them need to be somehow explained away, the second as 
much as the first. This is because we now worry not just about the temporary character of these facts, but 
rather about their very  temporal character. Thus, what we now expect from a theory of persistence is a 
reductive explanation of what being always bent really is, as much as of what being green at t1 really is. 
And  we  can  get  this  explanation  from  our  theories,  if  we  construe  them  as  relying  on  timeless 
exemplification: according to perdurance theory, the banana’s being always bent is really a matter of all its 
temporal parts being timelessly bent (i.e., bent simpliciter rather than at times). The RTT view, on the other 
hand, tells us that the banana’s being always bent is really a matter of the banana’s timelessly bearing the 
bent  at relation  to  all  times  in  which  it  exists.  Of  course,  such  a  reductive  account  of  temporal 
qualification could not be obtained by using a notion of eternal exemplification: relatively to our present  
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explanandum, no explanatory progress would be made by saying that the banana’s being always bent is 
really a matter of all its temporal parts being  always bent, or a matter of bearing  always the  bent at 
relation to all times. Thus, my suggestion is that, relatively to the goal of explaining temporal qualification 
in general (rather than just change), the views of persistence we have discussed should be understood as 
relying  on  timeless  exemplification.  Moreover,  if  you  think  like  Hawley  and  me  that  temporal 
qualification is the real underlying issue, then this conclusion follows simpliciter, and not only relatively 
to a particular goal.  
5. Two further remarks: the ‘no-change objection’ and orthodox perdurance.
In this final section, I want to address two further issues. First, I want to comment on how the main result 
of last section relates to the so called ‘no-change objections’ that have been advanced against perdurance 
theory  and  the  RTT  view.  Second,  I  want  to  discuss  further  my  claim  that  timeless  property 
exemplification gives a reasonable construal of perdurance theory.    
No-change  objections  against  theories  of  persistence  are  well  known and  trace  back to  McTaggart’s 
infamous proof of the unreality of time. Both perdurance theory and the RTT view have been targeted by 
arguments of this kind. The objection is based on the following observation: on the picture offered by 
these views on persistence, the banana is pictured as having all its properties and relations  atemporally, 
and therefore as somehow ‘static’.  At any time in which it  exists,  all  the facts about  the banana are, 
atemporally, ‘already there’. On the basis of this observation, it is then argued that the views fail to picture  
the banana as really changing. Standard answers to this objection point out (correctly, I think) that even 
granting the premise,  the conclusion follows only in virtue of assuming a question-begging notion of 
change.  This answer is  perfectly  appropriate,  but  I  think that something more can be said if  we pay 
attention to what exactly ‘atemporally’ means. Even the initial observation motivating the argument turns 
out to be wrong-headed if ‘atemporally’ is understood along the lines recommended above. In order to 
make the point clearer, I will focus on a particular version of this objection, in which the target is the RTT 
view.  
When applied  to the  RTT view,  the initial  observation that the banana is  pictured  as  static  takes  the 
following form: on the RTT view, the banana bears always the same relations to the same relata, some of 
which are times. That is to say, both at t1 and at t2 (and in fact, at all times in which it exists) the banana 
bears green at to t1 and yellow at to t2. (And more generally, for any n-adic relation R and for any objects 
x1…xn, if the banana at some time of its existence bears R to x1…xn, then it always bears R to x1...xn). This 
11
is therefore the first premise of the no-change objection: the banana is pictured as bearing always the same 
relations to the same relata, some of which are times. The second premise is that change is a matter of  
having different properties at different times (for instance, being green at  t1 and yellow at  t2) or bearing 
different relations to the same relata at different times (for instance, being north from NYC at t1 and being 
south from NYC at t2). That is to say, an object x changes from t1 to t2 iff for some n-adic relation R and 
for some objects  y1…yn, R(x, y1…yn) at  t1 and not  R(x, y1…yn) at  t2. But this is precisely what does not 
happen to the banana, according to the first premise. Thus, the no-change objector draws the conclusion 
that RTT view fails to picture the banana as really changing.6 Now, the right response to this argument is 
that the second premise begs the question against the RTT view by holding onto the notion of change that 
the RTT theorist is precisely explaining away. In other words, having accepted (as a premise for reduction)  
the RTT’s description of the banana as bearing always the same relations to the same relata, the objector 
should thereby accept the corresponding RTT’s picture of change. But in defining change as in the second 
premise of his argument, he does not. Thus, the objector is not being consistent and the RTT theorist has 
little to fear: even granting the first premise, the conclusion does not follow in a non-question begging 
way. 
But  also  the  first  premise  of  the  argument  may  be  objectionable,  if  the  RTT view is  construed  as 
recommended above. This first premise pictures the banana as bearing always the same relations to the 
same times. But if we understand relations to times as holding timelessly, this is the wrong picture. It is 
not the case that the banana bears always the same relations to the same times, because these relations are 
not  themselves born  at  times.  The important  point  to  notice is  that all  the initial  persuasiveness  that 
argument might have derives from picturing the banana as having all its relations  eternally. Since this 
actually is the way in which we ordinarily think of unchanging objects, when we are asked to picture the 
banana as eternally exemplifying all the same relations and properties, we are naturally well disposed to 
conclude that the banana does not change. But we would not be equally well predisposed to draw this 
conclusion if, instead, we were asked to picture the banana as timelessly exemplifying all its relations to 
times. This way of picturing objects in time is not familiar at all, and in particular is not the way in which 
we  ordinary  think  of  unchanging  objects.  Thus,  if  the  argument  has  some  initial  intuitive  pull,  it 
evaporates once we understand the RTT view as relying on timeless exemplification. Having so construed 
the theory, the argument cannot even get off the ground, since it cannot illegitimately exploit our intuitions 
about unchanging objects. In conclusion: the no-change objection fails for the well know reasons stated in 
the standard response above. What I am now suggesting is that, quite independently of those reasons, the  
6 A slightly more sophisticated version of this argument is actually advanced by Rodríguez-Pereyra (2003). 
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objection simply does not arise against a theory of persistence that relies on timeless rather than eternal 
exemplification. 
As a final remark, I want to discuss a bit further my claim that timeless exemplification can buy us a 
reasonable understanding of perdurance theory. By ‘reasonable’ I mean an understanding that is itself 
coherent and compatible with most of perdurance theorists’ claims and motivations. For the reasons given 
above, I think timeless exemplification does buy this. However, some of the perdurantist’s standard claims 
and  notions  may  have  to  be  rephrased  or  disambiguated  in  the  direction  required  by  timeless 
exemplification. This should not come as a surprise: after all, what I have been arguing all along is that  
timeless exemplification is  one reasonable understanding, not that it is the only one. In fact, my central 
claim  has  been  that  standard  presentations  of  perdurance  theory  (as  well  as  of  the  RTT view)  are 
compatible with both understandings of ‘atemporal’. More precisely, I think the situation is this: most of 
the perdurantist’s characteristic claims are compatible with both understandings of ‘atemporal’, but some 
of them actually do suggest that eternal exemplification is being intended. These are the claims that would 
need rephrasing if timeless exemplification is adopted. 
Maybe the very definition of ‘temporal part’ is a candidate for rephrasing. Sider’s definition, for instance, 
is as follows: “x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df (i) x exists at, but only at, t; (2); x is 
part of y at t, and (3) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t”.7 In this definition, x is said to be part 
of y at t, both in the definens and the definendum. In the latter case, however, temporal qualification need 
not bother us.  Sider very explicitly says that, for dialectical purposes, he is offering a definition that could 
be intelligible by the lights of someone who claimed not to understand atemporal parthood (and atemporal 
exemplification  in  general).8 That  is  to  say,  he  is  describing  temporal  parts  as  some  opponents  of 
perdurance would do it, not as the perdurantist himself does. But temporal qualification occurs also in the 
definendum, and here these dialectical reasons do not apply: it is the perdurantist notion itself what is here 
temporally qualified, and not only the ancillary notions in virtue of which it is made intelligible to non-
perdurantists. It seems, therefore, that Sider’s notion of temporal part is intended to allow claims as the 
following: “bananat1 is an instantaneous temporal part of the banana at instant t1”. This is compatible with 
Sider’s idea that temporal parts exemplify its properties and relations atemporally, if by ‘atemporally’ he  
7 Sider (2001), p. 59.
8 “Throughout much of this book I will happily speak of atemporal parthood. But when I am trying to convince my opponents 
that fourdimensionalism is intelligible I had better not speak of atemporal parthood (…) Any argument for four-dimensionalism 
that uses ‘part of’ without temporal qualification in its premises faces the charge of begging the question since it is central to 
many versions of three-dimensionalism that ‘part of’ requires temporal qualification. So I will qualify the part-whole relation to 
times in my formulation of four-dimensionalism”. (p. 57). 
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means eternally (if bananat1 is eternally part of the banana, then it is also so at t1). But it is not compatible 
if timeless exemplification is adopted instead. If perdurance theory is construed as claiming that banana t1 is 
timelessly part of the banana, then it is not part of the view that banana t1 is part of the banana at t1. So, if 
timeless exemplification is adopted by the perdurantist, the definition offered by Sider should be rephrased 
in the definendum side. Instead of saying that  x is an instantaneous temporal part of  y at instant t, we 
could instead say that  x is the instantaneous temporal part of  y that exists at t. This way of talking is 
intended as not to suggest x is part of y at t and yet be compatible with the following perdurantist’s core 
ideas: (i) that x is part of y simpliciter, (ii) that for y to exist at t is for y to have x as a part, (iii) that for y to 
have property P at t is for x to have P simpliciter. 
Let me make a last  remark of clarification,  also related to the viability of timeless exemplification as 
reasonable understanding of perdurance theory. I have been pointing to the perdurantist idea that temporal  
parts have their properties  simpliciter. This claim inevitably echoes D. Lewis’ claims in his influential 
discussion of the problem of temporary intrinsics (1986, 2002). Actually, the fact that temporal parts have 
their properties simpliciter is Lewis’ main reason for believing in their existence: something must be there 
to bent simpliciter, rather than just relatively to one time or another. (Lewis 2002, p. 4). It is tempting to  
read Lewis as claiming here that temporal parts have their properties timelessly, in the sense I have been 
discussing. I think we can legitimately do this, and understand accordingly everything that Lewis says 
about temporal parts. Maybe some of Lewis claims will need appropriate rephrasing (as illustrated above 
with respect to Sider’s definition of ‘temporal part’), but the result will be a reasonable understanding of 
Lewis: a view which is coherent by itself and compatible with most of Lewis’ claims and motivations in  
talking about temporal parts. This said, l hasten to acknowledge that it is doubtful that by ‘simpliciter’ 
Lewis means the same as I do here. When I say that banana1 is bent simpliciter, what I mean implies that 
banana1 is not bent at t1 (or rather, the question of whether it is bent at t1 does not arise). Lewis, on the 
contrary, seems to allow for this possibility. For him, being bent simpliciter (with respect to times) seems  
to be being bent eternally, i.e.  absolutely with respect to the parameter of time. This is not surprising, 
however, for the following reason: as I have pointed out, the idea that some things must be bent simpliciter  
in  my  sense becomes  motivated  when  our  explanandum  as  theorists  of  persistence  is  temporal 
qualification in general rather than change by itself. Now, Lewis neglects this more general explanandum. 
For him, “the problem about persistence is the problem of change”.9 Therefore, for the reasons already 
9 Lewis (2002), p. 1. Similarly, some of his earlier (1986) remarks about the problem of temporary intrinsics suggest that for 
him the real issue is change by itself. He does not make this point explicitly with respect to change across time, but he does so 
in relation to the parallel problem in the modal case: “[the problem of accidental intrinsics] would not arise for Humphrey’s 
essential properties, however intrinsic. For the problem is how he can have different properties as part of different worlds, and  
in the case of essential properties there is no variation to worry about. It is very hard to see how Humphrey could be a man as 
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explained in section 4,  it  is  natural  for him to think of temporal  parts as exemplifying his properties  
eternally. There is no reason for him to look further and take exemplification to be timeless.  
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